weren't so serious, the paramechanical hypothesis might even be funny.) Now, whether or not Descartes made this mistake, I think contemporary reductive representationalists make a precisely analogous one in their account of non-veridical perception.
These theorists hold that the phenomenality of experience can be reduced to a kind of nonphenomenal intentionality, which in turn can be explained in naturalistic causal-informationalteleological terms. The qualitative features associated with an experience are properties, not of the experience, but of the worldly and bodily things it represents. The blue that characterizes what it's like to see a clear sky at noon, for example, is a property, not of one's experience of the sky, but of the sky. Its relevance to the characterization of the experience of a clear sky at noon is due to the fact that one's experience represents it, not that one's experience instantiates it.
To suppose that the latter is true is to commit what Place termed the "phenomenological fallacy" -that is, to conclude that properties of experienced objects are properties of experiences of them (because experience is required for awareness of them) -and to court all of the mysteries and explanatory dead ends of ontological dualism. Sound scientific philosophy requires that we give materialistic explanations of all phenomena, including mental ones. The mind is (or arises from, or supervenes on, or whatever) the brain; mental processes are brain processes; mental states are brain states; etc. Your brain doesn't turn blue when you look at a clear sky at noon; it doesn't taste like chocolate when you're eating mousse; and it doesn't sound like The Beatles when you're listening to Revolver. All of those properties are out in the world, though they are represented by what's in the head. One's perceptual representation of the sky is no more blue than one's conceptual representation of snow is white.
However, a prima facie problem for views like this is the existence of illusions, dreams, Intuitively, it may seem unproblematic to speak of non-veridical experience in this way.
If you hallucinate a baboon in the living room wearing a pink teddy, it seems perfectly natural to say that your experience represents an object that might have been in the living room, and a color that might have been locally instantiated. But interpreting this to mean that your experience represents an object that is located in the (or a) living room in some other possible world, or an uninstantiated color, is not consistent with the reductive representationalist's claim that the qualitative features of experience are features of the objects of experience, and not experience itself. For, neither otherworldly objects nor uninstantiated properties appear to us the way actual objects and instantiated properties do. Indeed, they don't appear at all. Neither merely possible baboons nor uninstantiated colors look like anything. The reductive representationalist says that in veridical experience objects appear to us in certain ways, but that these ways are properties of experienced objects, not our experience of them. But if the things that have the properties that appear to us are removed -either by simply eliminating them or by replacing them with things that don't have appearance properties -then the basis for a reductive account of the phenomenality of experience goes with them. Saying it's the same thing, only the dog is in another possible world, or doghood isn't instantiated, is just as bad as saying it's the same thing, only you don't have the dog. If there's no dog, there's no sense to saying it's the same thing.
Given that veridical and non-veridical experiences can be subjectively indistinguishable, Dretske's and Lycan's proposals can't account for the subjective indiscriminability of veridical and non-veridical experience. If subjective sameness of experience is understood in terms of the ways things appear, and uninstantiated properties don't appear, then dreaming or hallucinating and perceiving can't be the same, minus the external object, any more than a mental process can be the same as a physical process, minus the matter, or radio can be the same
